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ABSTRACT
CRYPTANALYSIS OF SIGABA
by Wing On Chan
SIGABA is a World War II cipher machine used by the United States. Both the 
United States Army and the United States Navy used it for tactical communication. In this 
paper, we consider an attack on SIGABA using the largest practical keyspace for the 
machine. This attack will highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the machine, as well as 
provide an insight into the strength of the security provided by the cipher.
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1. Introduction
The ECM (Electronic Cipher Machine) Mk II is a cipher machine used by the United States 
(U.S.) during World War II and into the 1950s. The ECM Mk II was also known by several 
other names, depending on which branch of the United States military was using it. The 
U.S. Army called the machine the SIGABA or Converter M-134. The U.S. Navy called the 
machine the CSP-888/889 [6]. For this paper, we will use the Army designation of 
SIGABA for the machine. SIGABA was created out of the need for a better rotor cipher 
machine since U.S. cryptographers were aware of the susceptibility of single stepping rotor 
machines. William Friedman, the directory of the U.S. Army’s Signals Intelligence Service, 
and his associate, Frank Rowlett were the ones who developed the SIGABA. Friedman 
developed a system to randomize rotor movement, while Rowlett came up with a way to 
advance rotors with other rotors. The strength of SIGABA was proven during its service 
lifetime, as there is no record of a successful cyptological attack on the machine. During the 
war, it is said that the Germans were never able to break SIGABA. It is also said that the 
Japanese gave up on breaking SIGABA due to the seemingly random nature of the stepping 
[3]. 
Figure 1: ECM Mark II, CSP 889/2900 [9]
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2. SIGABA Machine
The SIGABA cipher machine is a rotor-based machine that uses rotating, wired rotor 
wheels that are removable and interchangeable. SIGABA is similar to the Enigma machine, 
except that SIGABA uses 15 rotors to encrypt a message compared to the Enigma’s three 
rotors [2]. For the 15 rotors, there are three groups of rotors, five cipher rotors, five control 
rotors, and five index rotors. The input is from a typewriter-style keyboard and the cipher 
produces output on an output device, usually a paper tape. The SIGABA machine has a 
rotor cage that holds the 15 rotors. The cage holds three banks of rotors, with a bank for 
each type of rotor: cipher, control and index. 
2.1 Rotors
The cipher and control rotors each have 26 contacts on the two faces of the rotor, while the 
index rotors have 10 contacts on each face. The cipher and control rotors permute one letter 
of the alphabet to another letter, while the index rotors permute one digit to another digit. 
The rotors used for the cipher and control rotors could be interchanged to serve as either a 
cipher rotor or a control rotor. They could also be inserted into the rotor cage in a reversed 
orientation. The index rotors are inserted only in the forward orientation and are not 
inserted in a reversed orientation. There is nothing to prevent the rotor from being inserted 
in a reversed orientation. Before June 1945, the operation instructions allowed the index 
rotors to be inserted in reverse. However, after June 1945, when new instructions were 
released, the index rotors were left in the normal position [4]. For the purposes of this 
paper, whether this rotor is reversible is not important, as will be explained in a later 
section. Therefore, we will assume that the index rotors are only inserted in a forward 
orientation for analysis and comparison purposes. 
Figure 2: ECM Mark II - Cipher/Control Rotor & Index Rotor [9]
When the cipher and control rotors are inserted in the normal orientation, the current 
position is shown to the user as a right side up letter that steps in reverse alphabetic order 
(assuming the rotor is in a position that will step). For example, in Figure 3, a rotor inserted 
in the normal position at letter O will have the letter P above it and the letter N below it. If 
the rotor steps, the current position will change to N with the letter O above it and the letter 
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M below it. If the rotor is inserted in the reversed orientation, the current position is shown 
upside down. Using the same example for the normal orientation, except with the rotor 
inserted in the reverse orientation (Figure 4), the user would see an upside down O as the 
current position, with an upside down N above it and an upside down P below it. If the 
rotor steps, the current position will be an upside down P with an upside down O above it 
and an upside down Q below it. 
Figure 3: SIGABA Cipher/Control Rotors - 
Normal Orientation [1]
Figure 4: SIGABA Cipher/Control Rotors - 
Reverse Orientation [1]
The index rotors are inserted in only the normal orientation (though as previously 
mentioned, they could be inserted in a reversed orientation), with the current position 
appearing as a right side up digit. However, unlike the cipher and control rotors, which 
appear in a decreasing order in the normal orientation, the index rotors appear in an 
increasing order in the normal orientation. 
Figure 5: SIGABA Index Rotor [1]
The machine is initialized by inserting the rotors into their respective banks within the rotor 
cage. However, before the rotors can be inserted into the rotor cage, certain decisions must 
be made regarding the key. First, the five rotors that will be used as cipher rotors and the 
five rotors that will be used as control rotors must be selected from the ten available rotors. 
Next, a permutation of the five cipher rotors and a permutation of the five control rotors 
need to be decided. After the permutation is selected, the orientations of the ten rotors must 
be selected. For each of the ten rotors, an initial starting position must be picked. Once that 
is done, the ten rotors are inserted into the cipher rotor bank and the control rotor bank 
within the rotor cage. After the cipher and control rotors are inserted, the five index rotors 
must be set and inserted. A permutation of the five index rotors must be selected, as well as 
their starting position. Index rotors can only be inserted in one orientation. Once the 
permutation and starting positions are chosen, the index rotors can be inserted into the 
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index rotor bank in the rotor cage. Once that is done, the machine is initialized with the key 
and is now ready to encrypt or decrypt a message. 
Figure 6: ECM Mark II Rotor Cage [9]
2.2 Encryption
During the encryption process, the plaintext is entered using the keyboard. When a key is 
pressed on the keyboard, a signal is generated that is sent to two of the three banks of rotors 
in the rotor cage. The first signal is sent to the left side of the cipher rotor bank. It is then 
permuted through the five cipher rotors to produce the ciphertext. The second signal is sent 
to the right side of the control rotor bank. However, the signal is handled differently from 
the signal sent to the cipher rotor bank. 
For the control rotors, the signal is used to energize the input into the control rotor bank. 
Four inputs to the control rotor bank are energized when a key is pressed on the keyboard. 
The four inputs are always ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, and ‘I’ regardless of which letter was pressed on 
the keyboard. These four signals are then permuted through the control rotors in a right to 
left fashion. Once the four signals emerge from the left side of the control rotor bank, the 
signals go through an ORing to determine which inputs for the index rotor bank are 
energized. The following table shows the index rotor bank inputs that are energized for the 
different control rotor outputs.
10
Figure 7: SIGABA Encryption [1]
I1 = B I4 = F || G || H I7 = P || Q || R || S || T
I2 = C I5 = I || J || K I8 = U || V || W || X || Y || Z
I3 = D || E I6 = L || M || N || O I9 = A
Table 1: Active Index Rotor Inputs
In the table, Ij is the jth input of the index rotor bank. For example, “I7 = P || Q || R || S || T” 
means that the seventh input to the index rotor bank is active if any of the four outputs from 
the control rotor bank are P, Q, R, S, or T. I0 is never energized. Table 1 applies to the CSP-
889 version of the machine only. The later CSP-2900 version operates in a different 
manner. In that version, the mapping of the output letters of the control rotors to active 
inputs of the index bank was different. In addition, instead of just ‘F’ ‘G’, ‘H’, and ‘I’ being 
active inputs to the control rotors, ‘D’ and ‘E’ were also activate [4].
After each letter that is keyed, one to three of the control rotors will step. Counting from the 
left, the fast control rotor is the third rotor in the control rotor bank, the medium control 
rotor is the fourth rotor in the control rotor bank, and the slow control rotor is the second 
rotor in the control rotor bank. The fast rotor steps once for each letter keyed into the 
keyboard. The medium control rotor steps once every time the fast rotor transitions from O 
to another letter. For the forward orientation, this would be a transition from O to N. For 
the reverse orientation, it would be from O to P. In [4], it is claimed that for a reversed 
rotor, the transition occurs at A to B rather than O to P. Our description of the transition 
occurring at O to P is consistent with the two simulators at [7] and [8]. The slow control 
rotor steps once every time the medium control rotor makes a transition from O to N in the 
forward orientation or O to P in the reversed orientation. The first and fifth control rotors 
11
remain fixed during operation and are not changed by the encryption process like the fast, 
medium, and slow control rotors.
Due to the ORing of the control rotor bank’s output, one to four of the index rotor bank’s 
inputs will be energized. The active signals are permuted by the index rotor bank in a left to 
right fashion. The outputs of the index rotor bank are then ORed again, though in a 
different manner, to determine which cipher rotor should step. The following table shows 
which cipher rotor will step based on the outputs of the index rotor bank.
C0 = O0 || O9
C1 = O7 || O8
C2 = O5 || O6
C3 = O3 || O4
C4 = O1 || O2
Table 2: Cipher Rotor Stepping Table
The table is in the format of Cj = Ox || Oy. This means that cipher rotor j will step if the 
outputs of the index rotor bank contain either x or y. 
Figure 8: Control & Index Rotor ORing [1]
An interesting quirk of SIGABA’s encryption algorithm is that the letter Z, and a word 
space are treated slightly differently than other letters. Other letters are sent to the cipher 
rotor bank without any modifications. However, the letter Z, and a word space are modified 
before being sent to the cipher rotor bank. If the letter Z is input on the keyboard, it is 
changed to an X before being sent to the cipher rotor bank. If a word space is input on the 
keyboard, it is changed to the letter Z before being sent to the cipher rotor bank. 
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2.3 Decryption
Decryption works in the same manner as encryption except with two changes. The machine 
is initialized in the same manner with the same key. However, when a key is pressed on the 
keyboard, a signal is sent to the right side of the cipher rotor bank instead of the left side. 
The second change is how the decryption of the letter Z and a word space work. When the 
output of the cipher rotor bank is the letter Z, it is changed to a space before being sent to 
the output device. Something to note here is that the decrypted plaintext will never have the 
letter Z in it. Any Z’s in the original plaintext will be decrypted as an X. Table 3 shows 
what happens to the letter Z and spaces during encryption and decryption.
Figure 9: SIGABA Decryption [1]
Plaintext ZERO ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX
Ciphertext IEQDEMOKGJEYGOKWBXAIPKRHWARZODWG
Decrypted Ciphertext XERO ONE TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX
Table 3: Encryption/Decryption Quirk
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2.4 Physical Security & Operation Guidelines
A cryptographic system is only as strong as the people who operate it. The United States 
considered physical security important during the war, as evident by the operational 
guidelines and equipment available for SIGABA that was not required for the actual use of 
the machine. Although reliance on physical security was used during the war, today, heavy 
reliance on physical security of a cryptographic system could be a serious mistake. 
Kerckhoffs Principle states that a cryptographic system’s strength should only depend on 
keeping the key a secret while not keeping the system’s algorithm a secret. This means that 
an attacker is assumed to have full knowledge of how the algorithms and the system work. 
In other words, the system is not a black box system that obtains its strength from “security 
by obfuscation”. During the war, the United States formally trained operators and 
monitored their compliance with operation procedures. When procedures were not 
followed, memorandums were sent to inform operators about the errors and the 
consequences of those errors. The following are excerpts from the memorandum in [9].
“The principles of communication security cannot be over stressed, for such security is 
vital to the success of operations. Errors which seem minor in themselves may, when 
accumulated, offer to the enemy an entering wedge for the eventual compromise of a 
system. The object of this memorandum is to enlist your cooperation in protecting our 
cipher systems and hence our national security.”
“THE PRICE OF SECURITY IS ETERNAL VIGILANCE.”
“CARELESS COMMUNICATIONS COST LIVES”
As for the physical security of these cipher machines, safes were often used to house them. 
A Type 8 Safe Locker (Figure 10) used to house the SIGABA machines weighed 172 
pounds when empty [5], with the actual SIGABA machine weighing around 94 pounds [9]. 
A “semi-portable” field safe, the Army Field Safe CH 76 (Figure 11), was used for 
installation of the cipher machine at advanced bases. The total weigh of this safe, the cipher 
machine, and it’s wooden box, was around 650 pounds, with provisions for the housing of 
two M1 Thermite bombs [5]. 
In [5], the operations manual has several sections (111 – 117) that deal specifically with 
destruction of the machine and any other confidential information related to the machine, 
such as code lists and rotors. These sections include instructions on how to remove and 
dispose of the wires within a rotor, how to smash the rotor wheels, where to dispose of the 
pieces, and even how to use the explosives in the demolition kit to destroy the machine if 
the need arose. One wonders how this occurred on a naval vessel that was under attack and 
in danger of sinking.
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In addition to the safes, the machines were usually under armed guard. The Americans had 
strict rules about where SIGABA could be deployed. The area it would be used in had to be 
secure. SIGABA wasn’t to be used in the field unless it was at a base where it was under 
constant security. The machine wasn’t given to Allied nations during the war since the 
United States was afraid that if their strong cipher made it to the hands of the enemy 
somehow, that the enemy ciphers would become “invincible”. The POTUS-PRIME link 
that is described later may be a partial exception to this.
Figure 10: Type 8 Safe Locker [5] Figure 11: Army Field Safe CH 76 [5]
2.5 Theoretical Keyspace
First, we will discuss the theoretical keyspace of the SIGABA machine. We consider a key 
to include the follow.
1. The choice of the five cipher rotors.
2. The choice of the five control rotors.
3. The choice of the five index rotors.
Each cipher and control rotor permute the 26 letters of the alphabet. This means that each 
cipher and control rotor have 26! different possible permutations. Similarly, the index 
rotors permute the digits to another digit. This means the index rotors each had 10! different 
permutations. Combining these different permutations gives a theoretical keyspace of (26!)5 
* (26!)5 * (10!)5 ≈ 2993 different keys for the machine. We do not need to consider the 
starting positions of the 15 rotors in this calculation since we are considering all possible 
rotor wirings. A different starting position would be equivalent to another rotor wiring. For 
15
this reason, we can treat all the possible rotor wirings as being set to some standard starting 
position. Since the index rotors do not step at all during the operation of the machine, the 
(10!)5 permutations for the index rotors reduce down to 10! distinct permutations. This 
reduces the theoretical keyspace down to (26!)10 * 10! ≈ 2906.
The theoretical keyspace seems to indicate that the key is the equivalent of a modern cipher 
key that is 906 bits long, which is over three and a half times longer than the largest 
encryption key today of 256 bits. If this were true, it would certainly explain why there are 
no recorded instances of SIGABA ever being broken during the war by enemy forces. 
However, is this keyspace accurate? Unfortunately, the answer is no. SIGABA did not have 
a real keyspace of 906 bits. Several factors limited the actual keyspace of the machine 
during its operation lifetime.
2.6 Practical Keyspace
The assumptions we made when determining the theoretical keyspace of SIGABA are 
unrealistic. It would be impossible to make rotors for each possible wiring. It is also 
impossible for that much equipment to be used in the field. In reality, there were only 10 
rotors available for the cipher and control rotors and 5 rotors for the index rotors. There 
were several sets of rotors that available for use, but for our purposes, we will consider only 
one set of 15 rotors. This means that there are 10! ways to permute the 10 26-letter rotors, 
and 210 ways to orient them. For each cipher and control rotor, there are 26 possible starting 
positions. For each of the index rotors, there are 10 possible starting positions. This gives a 
practical keyspace of 10! * 210 * 2610 * 105 ≈ 295 bits. Was this the actual keyspace available 
during the operational life of the SIGABA machine? Unfortunately, it wasn’t. Two factors 
reduced the practical keyspace even further. 
First, the cipher rotors can be set to any starting position. However, they were usually set to 
a standard position and stepped in a nonstandard manner, while at the same time, stepping 
the control rotors. This effectively reduced the keyspace by a factor of 265 since the starting 
position of the cipher rotors is constant. This means that the keyspace is now reduced to 10! 
* 210 * 265 * 105 ≈ 272 bits, as claimed in [10].
Another factor that further reduced the practical keyspace is that a message indicator was 
transmitted with the ciphertext for a message. Looking at the operation manual for 
SIGABA shows that the control rotors’ starting positions are sent in the clear with the 
encrypted ciphertext message [5]. If an attacker intercepted a message and knew the 
meaning of the message indicator, that reduced the practical keyspace by a factor of 265. 
With these two factors, the actual keyspace available for SIGABA during its operational 
lifetime would have been 10! * 210 * 105 ≈  248.4 bits. Today, a key of this size is vulnerable 
to an exhaustive key search. The Data Encryption Standard (DES) uses a 56 bit key and has 
been successfully attacked using an exhaustive key search. However, during World War II, 
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it would have been impossible to attempt an exhaustive key search unless there was a 
shortcut attack that could reduce the keyspace to a more manageable size for World War II 
era technology. 
There is a variant of SIGABA used between United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during the war that was more secure called 
POTUS-PRIME1 [4]. Instead of sending the control rotor settings in the clear as part of a 
message indicator, a codebook using three letter codewords was used instead. A codeword 
is also used to indicate the cipher rotor settings, in addition to the control rotor settings. 
These two codewords were sent with the message indicator instead. This increased the 
keyspace since the cipher rotors could be set independently and the control rotor settings 
weren’t sent in the clear with the message indicator. This gave the POTUS-PRIME variant 
a keyspace of 10! * 210 * 265 * 265 * 105 ≈  295.4 bits. 
In Section 2.4, we mentioned that the United States did not allow access to SIGABA, even 
to Allied nations. The POTUS-PRIME link seems to be a contradiction to this. However, 
what most likely happened was that the machine in Britain was guarded and operated by 
American forces. The operators would send and receive the messages and then relay the 
messages to Churchill and his staff without giving the British direct access to the machine. 
1 President Of The United States – Prime Minister
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3. Attacks On SIGABA
3.1 Previous Work
There have been two previous attempts to attack SIGABA. The first attempt is described in 
[4]. In this attack, John J. G. Savard and Richard S. Pekelney describe an attack that 
requires no known plaintext. Their attack relies only on intercepted ciphertext messages 
and does not rely on knowing the plaintext beforehand. For their attack, the plaintext is 
recovered using Kerchoffs superimposition, which is described in [10].  The attack attempts 
to reconstruct nearly complete cipher alphabets produced by the cipher rotors. By looking 
at the different alphabets that are reconstructed, they can find cases of rotor steppings. Once 
the wirings of the cipher rotors are reconstructed, they have the stepping motions of the 
cipher rotors, which they mention can be used to attack the control rotors. This attack 
requires a large amount of intercepted messages. The authors estimate that ten to fifteen 
messages sent during the same day using the same key would be needed. This is highly 
improbable. In their description, there was no mention of the expected work factor for this 
attack.
The other attack on SIGABA is from Michael Lee [10]. In Lee’s attack, he first examines 
attacking simpler versions of SIGABA that only have one, two, and three cipher rotors. The 
attack on a single rotor version of SIGABA recovered the rotor wiring. In the attack on the 
two and three rotor versions of SIGABA, he assumes that the wiring of the rotors is known. 
The attack will recover the plaintext, the order of the rotors, and their initial positions. No 
attacks are described for a four or five rotor SIGABA machine, though the estimated time 
needed for attacking a four or five rotor machine using the attack on a three rotor machine 
are extrapolated.   
3.2 SIGABA Attack
For the attack on SIGABA, we assume that all three rotor banks can be set independently, 
no settings are sent in a message indicator, that there are 10 rotors available for use as 
cipher and control rotors and 5 rotors available for the index rotors and the internal wiring 
of the 15 rotors is known to the attacker. Cipher and control rotors may be inserted in either 
the normal or reversed orientations, while the index rotors can only be inserted in the 
normal orientation. This gives us a keyspace of 10! * 210 * 265 * 265 * 5! * 105 ≈  2102.3 bits. 
Recall that the outputs of the index rotor bank are ORed together in order to determine 
which of the cipher rotors will step. Instead of having 5! * 105 different index rotor settings, 
we only have 52
!10
= 113,400 ≈ 216.8 distinct index rotor settings. This reduces the keyspace 
down to 10! * 210 * 265 * 265 * 113,400 ≈ 295.8. 
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The attack on SIGABA will consist of two different phases. Phase 1 tries all possible cipher 
rotor initial positions and determines which settings are consistent with the known 
plaintext/ciphertext pair. For each setting that is consistent, we will also know which rotors 
are used as cipher rotors and what orientation they are inserted into the machine in. Here, 
we will refer to the rotors used, their orientations, and their initial positions collectively as a 
“setting”. There will be two types of settings: random and causal. Random settings are 
settings that survive Phase 1 but are incorrect settings for the plaintext/ciphertext pair. 
Since Phase 1 only considers the cipher rotors, there may be an incorrect surviving setting 
that is valid. However, this setting may become invalid once the control and index rotors 
are also examined. The causal setting is the actual setting used to encrypt the known 
plaintext to the known ciphertext. Phase 1 will recover all possible cipher rotor settings. 
In Phase 2, we take the survivors from Phase 1 and attempt to recover the control rotor 
settings. In this attack, the index rotor settings are not recovered directly as a permutation 
of the five index rotors and their positions. The index rotor setting will be recovered as an 
equivalent permutation of the 10 digits. In effect, the index rotors will be recovered as a 
collapsed version of the five rotors.
3.3 Phase 1
During Phase 1 of the attack, we will need to select five of the ten available rotors to use as 
cipher rotors. There are 


 10
5
 = 252 possible ways to pick five rotors. For the five selected 
rotors, there are 5! ways to arrange them. For each of these rotors, we can insert them in 
either the normal or reversed orientation. For each rotor, there are 26 possible starting 
positions. This gives 


 10
5
* 5! * 2 5 * 265  ≈ 243.4 initial settings that we need to try. 
For phase 1, we analyze the cipher rotor bank in isolation. For each initial setting, we pass a 
plaintext letter through the cipher rotors to determine the corresponding ciphertext letter. If 
the output of the cipher rotor bank matches the known ciphertext that we have, we attempt 
to recursively test the remaining letters. After the first letter is encrypted, one to four of the 
cipher rotors can step. This means that we need to try the 30 possible steppings of the 
cipher rotors and determine which, if any, of the 30 possible steppings will encrypt the next 
plaintext letter correctly. At each step after the initial plaintext letter, this 30 stepping test 
must be done. 
At first glance, the testing of all initial settings seems like a fixed amount of work and is 
equivalent to an exhaustive key search. However, if we model the encryption permutations 
as being uniformly random, we get a binomial distribution where the probability of a match 
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p = 
26
1
and n = 30. This means that for any given letter (beyond the first), we expect the 
number of survivors to grow at a rate of 
26
30
 ≈ 1.15 per letter. This is a property of the 
machine having five rotors. In a machine that uses the same cipher but with less than five 
rotors, the growth rate is less than one, indicating a decrease in survivors, as the message 
length gets longer. Such a machine would have a much weaker cipher due the decreasing 
number of survivors. Attacks on machines that use the same cipher but use less than five 
cipher rotors are described in [10]. The paper in [10] also extrapolates the amount of time 
needed to attack the full five-rotor version of Sigaba. However, that paper fails to take into 
account the branching phenomenon. While a decrease in survivors is what we would like to 
see, we can still get useful information from the survivors. 
The five rotor design made SIGABA more secure since it means that at any given step 
beyond the first letter, there are 
26
30
 ≈ 1.15 surviving paths. A way to decrease the number 
of surviving paths in Phase 1 is to store a record of the survivors in a tree-like format and 
merge any branches that have the same common parent node. In Figure 12, the tree has two 
children for the starting position AAAAA. There are two possible steppings for the cipher 
rotors from the position AAAAA. For each of those two steppings, they have a valid 
stepping to the third letter in the message. If two paths both reach the same intermediate 
position at the same level of the tree, which in Figure 10 would the intermediate position of 
BBBBA at step 2, one of the paths can be trimmed. This is seen in Figure 11. The actual 
path that is trimmed does not matter since from this step on, the two paths will be identical. 
In Figure 11, the path from position BBABA at step 1 to BBBBA is trimmed and is merged 
into the path from ABABA to BBBBA. Based on this trimming and merging of paths, we 
can eliminate a significant number of paths if we keep track of paths we have already 
visited before without decreasing our chances of finding the correct setting. Since we are 
only concerned with the initial starting position (in this example AAAAA), we can prune 
the branch from BBABA and “redirect” it to the child of ABABA, as shown in Figure 13. 
This is partially described in [1]. In the random case, before any merging, we expect the 
number of paths to increase by a factor of 
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30
 ≈ 1.154. In the causal case, we expect the 
number of paths to be greater since we are guaranteed one causal match, with the remaining 
elements matching in the random case. This allows us to statistically distinguish between 
the causal case and the random cases.  This distinction will also reduce the number of 
random cases that we must test later.
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Figure 12: Tree Before Branch 
Collapsing and Pruning [1]
Figure 13: Tree After Branch 
Collapsing and Pruning [1]
The results in Table 4 are derived using the following method. Given a known 
plaintext/ciphertext pair, we ran a certain number of tests on it. A random setting for the 
order and initial positions of the rotors was generated. Next, the first plaintext letter is 
encrypted before any rotors are stepped. Here, a random setting will survive the first step 
with a 1/26 probability. If the setting survives the first letter, the rotors can be stepped in 30 
different ways. Any stepping that is consistent for the second letter is saved. This is 
repeated for all the letters until one of two things happens. If the last letter is reached, then 
the path is valid and will be considered for Phase 2. The other option is that if at any letter, 
none of the 30 possible steppings for the cipher rotors yields a consistent path, that path is 
eliminated since it is a random path. Table 5 was generated using the same method. 
However, instead of a random setting, the causal setting was used. 
From Table 4, we can see that as the number of letters (steps) increases, the number of 
surviving settings decreases. This shows that the number of random settings can be reduced 
using a small amount of known plaintext and ciphertext. However, we need to note that 
although the number of surviving settings decreases, the number of surviving paths (non-
zero settings * average per non-zero) increases. For example, in Table 4, for a 30-letter 
message, we expect that 0.427% of the random settings (Non-Zero Settings) will survive, 
with each survivor expanding to an average of about 16.5 paths and a maximum of 84 
paths. For the causal case, Table 5 shows that for a 30-letter message, we expect 29.6 paths 
with the 10,000 cases tests. We also expect a minimum of one and a maximum of 151 
consistent paths.
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Steps 
(Letters)
Tests Non-Zero 
Settings
Average Per 
Non-Zero
Maximum
10 105 763 6.5 27
20 105 516 11.8 56
30 105 427 16.5 84
40 105 324 20.8 105
50 105 290 28.4 194
60 105 275 38.8 163
70 105 269 47.1 415
80 105 212 71.3 524
90 105 216 77.6 486
100 105 203 100.5 1005
Table 4: Random Case [1]
Steps Tests Average Maximum Minimum
10 10,000 10.2 51 1
20 10,000 19.6 94 1
30 10,000 29.6 151 1
40 10,000 40.1 237 1
50 10,000 54.1 404 1
60 10,000 69.2 566 1
70 5,000 85.0 689 1
80 5,000 105.0 829 2
90 3,000 130.4 1152 1
100 3,000 161.1 1926 1
Table 5: Causal Case [1]
From the information in Table 5, we could reduce the number of random settings by saving 
only those settings that meet some threshold. One example would be if the setting exceeds 
the expected mean in the causal case. This refinement to Phase 1 would decrease the 
number of random settings, but at the same time, it makes the attack probabilistic since we 
may end up discarding the causal case. 
If we are given a small amount of known plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext, we 
expect the work factor to be on the order of 243.4 since most of the random cases will not 
survive the first known plaintext. If we use more plaintext letters and save the merged 
paths, then we may exceed 243.4 since the number of surviving paths increases as more 
letters are used. 
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Suppose we had a 100 letter known plaintext and ciphertext pair. After the first known 
plaintext letter, we have 
26
2 4.43
≈ 238.7 surviving paths. From Table 4, in the row for 100 
steps, the number of surviving merged paths increases to about 
4.414.43
5 22*10
5.100*203
≈
This means that when 99 letters are used after the first letter, the number of merged paths 
increases from 238.7 to 241.1 and all merged paths must be processed at each step. We can 
approximate the number of paths at an arbitrary step k by using 238.7xk. For this example, we 
would have 238.7x99 = 241.1. Solving this equation gives us x ≈ 1.017. Using
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the primary work can be calculated by 
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For 100 plaintext letters, we see that only about 241.1 merged paths will survive Phase 1. 
From Table 4, about 5.344.435 22*100*10
5.100*203
≈ random settings survive.
At the end of Phase 1, we will have a list of all initial cipher rotor settings that can possibly 
be the part of the correct key. However, there will also be settings included in this list that 
are not valid since it may not be possible to step the cipher rotors in the same manner as the 
steppings of Phase 1. 
3.4 Phase 2
In Phase 2, we attempt to recover the control rotor settings. We are assuming that no 
message indicator was used here and that the control rotor settings were set independently. 
Since we already used five rotors for the cipher rotors in Phase 1, we only need to 
determine the order of the remaining five rotors and their orientations. After determining 
how the rotors are inserted, we need to determine the starting position of the control rotors. 
This gives us 5! * 25 * 265 ≈ 235.41 settings to try. As states previously mentioned, the actual 
number of index rotor permutations is only 113,400 ≈ 216.8. Combining the control and 
index rotors, we have about 5! * 25 * 265 * 113,400 ≈ 252.2 different settings to try. We test 
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the survivors of Phase 1 by setting the cipher rotors to the setting used by the survivor, then 
testing each of the 252.2 settings for the control and index rotors. Any survivors of Phase 2 
are valid keys for the known plaintext/ciphertext pair. Here, it appears that for each 
surviving setting from Phase 1, we have a work factor on the order of 252.2. Fortunately, we 
can improve on this rather naïve implementation of Phase 2.
4. Attack Refinements
The attack described in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 is more or less an exhaustive key search. 
While an exhaustive key search for the SIGABA keyspace as it was used during the war (≈ 
248.4 bits) is possible given the speed and power of today’s computers, an exhaustive key 
search for the practical keyspace is still not feasible, even with today’s computers.2 Here we 
will examine possible ways to reduce the keyspace in both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the 
attack. 
For Phase 2, we will look at an improvement that is also partially described in [1]. We will 
examine the frequency of the active outputs of the control rotor bank to the index rotor 
bank. Recall from Table 1 that the inputs for the index rotor bank are energized by a 
variable number of outputs from the control rotor bank. Input 8 of the index rotor bank is 
energized by six outputs of the control rotor bank, but inputs 9, 1, and 2 are each only 
energized by one output of the control rotor bank. With the frequency of the stepping of the 
cipher rotors from Phase 1’s survivors, we can estimate the probabilities for the index 
rotors’ permutation. 
In Figure 8, we show how the control and index rotors interact. In that figure, we have 
collapsed both banks of rotors into one equivalent rotor. The control rotors receive four 
energized inputs for F, G, H, and I. The four inputs are passed through the control rotor and 
combined according to the rules in Table 1 before being sent to the index rotors. The one to 
four active index rotor inputs are combined according to the rules in Table 2. Since the 
control rotors permutation changes with each letter, we model the collapsed version of the 
control rotors as being uniformly random. This means that we assume all of the 


 26
4
 = 
14,950 combinations of outputs from the control rotors are equally likely. However, since 
the outputs of the control rotors are ORed together according to Table 1, the inputs to the 
index rotors are not uniform. Input 8 on the index rotors will be active more than inputs 1, 
2, or 9 since input 8 is activated by 6 letter, whereas inputs 1, 2, and 9 are activated by only 
one letter. 
The index rotor outputs are ORed together according to the rules in Table 2 to determine 
which cipher rotors will step. If we can determine the frequency with which the cipher 
2 The 56 bit key for the Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been successfully attacked using an exhaustive 
key search. [2]
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rotors step, we can assign probabilities to the index permutation. For each of the surviving 
paths from Phase 1, we have a list of the cipher rotor steppings. By using this list, we can 
determine how many times each cipher rotor steps. For the merged paths from Phase 1, we 
do not lose any information. In Figure 11, we have the initial position of AAAAA. There 
are two paths from AAAAA to the second letter, BBABA and ABABA. At the third letter, 
both of those paths merged to BBBBA. Since both paths reached BBBBA, we know that on 
both paths, cipher rotors C0, C1, C2, and C3 stepped once while cipher rotor C4 did not step.
Let us consider an index permutation of (5, 4, 7, 9, 3, 8, 1, 0, 2, 6). This permutation 
indicates that an input of 0 maps to an output of 5, an input of 1 maps to an output of 4, and 
so forth. If we consider the pairs of outputs that will determine the cipher rotor steppings, 
we see that some rotors will step more often than others. In Table 6, inputs 6 and 8 map to 
outputs of 1 and 2 respectively. The inputs of 6 and 8 correspond to the outputs of 6 and 8 
from the control rotors. At least one of these outputs from the control rotors will be active if 
at least one of the following letters are the active output of the four signals though the 
control rotors according to Figure 8: L, M, N, O, U, V, W, X, Y, Z. The same method can 
be used to determine the letters that control the other four cipher rotors. From the counts, 
we can see that for this index permutation, cipher rotor C0 will step more than all the other 
cipher rotors. 
Cipher Rotor
C0 C1 C2 C3 C4
Index Rotor Outputs (1,2) (3,4) (5,6) (7,8) (9,0)
Index Rotor Inputs (6,8) (4,1) (0,9) (2,5) (3,7)
Control Rotor Count 10 4 1 4 7
Table 6: Index Permutation (5, 4, 7, 9, 3, 8, 1, 0, 2, 6) [1]
If we assume that the control rotors generate random permutations, the expected number of 
steps for a given cipher rotor i depends only on the number control rotor output letters that 
feed into cipher rotor Ci. The list of all 45 input pairs and their corresponding number of 
letters is show in Table 7. If a sufficient amount of plaintext is known, we can obtain 
information related to the Count column of Table 7 for each cipher rotor based on a count 
of the number of times that cipher rotor i has stepped. From this count, we can make 
restrictions on the index permutation using the Pairs column.
We can estimate the amount of plaintext that is needed in the following manner. Each 
cipher rotor is connected to k control rotor outputs, where 1 ≤ k ≤ 11. We can determine the 
expected stepping ratios for a rotor connected to exactly k control rotor outputs. These will 
sum up to a value greater than one since more than one rotor generally steps. To compute 
the ratios, we assume all control rotor outputs to be equally likely and generate all 


 26
4
= 
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14,950 outputs, counting the number of times that at least one element of each pair in Table 
7 occurs. Table 8 shows the results, where Step Ratio is obtained by dividing the Step 
Count column by 14,950. Note that these results are independent of the actual index rotor 
permutation.
Letters Count Pairs
1 3 (0,1) (0,2) (0,9)
2 4 (0,3) (1,2) (1,9) (2,9)
3 5 (0,4) (0,5) (1,3) (2,3) (3,9)
4 7 (0,6) (1,5) (2,5) (5,9) (1,4) (2,4) (4,9)
5 6 (0,7) (1,6) (2,6) (6,9) (3,4) (3,5)
6 6 (0,8) (1,7) (2,7) (7,9) (3,6) (4,5)
7 6 (1,8) (2,8) (8,9) (3,7) (4,6) (5,6)
8 3 (3,8) (4,7) (5,7)
9 3 (4,8) (5,8) (6,7)
10 1 (6,8)
11 1 (7,8)
Table 7: Index Permutation Input Pairs [1]
Letters Example Pairs Step Count Step Ratio
1 (0,1) 2,300 0.1538462
2 (0,3) 4,324 0.2892308
3 (0,4) 6,095 0.4076923
4 (0,6) 7,635 0.5107023
5 (0,7) 8,965 0.5996656
6 (0,8) 10,105 0.6759197
7 (1,8) 11,074 0.7407358
8 (3,8) 11,890 0.7953177
9 (4,8) 12,570 0.8408027
10 (6,8) 13,130 0.8782609
11 (7,8) 13,585 0.9086957
Table 8: Cipher Rotor Stepping Ratios [1]
Now given the cipher rotor stepping counts from Phase 1, we can use Table 8 to determine 
the most likely pairs of control rotor output letters for each cipher rotor. Since these are 
connected to the index permutation, this information combined with the information from 
Table 7 will reduce the number of possible index permutations. 
A valid index permutation must contain five pairs from Table 7 such that two conditions 
are met. The first condition is that each digit is used once and only once. The second 
condition is that the number of letters for the five pairs must sum up to exactly 26. If we 
order all the valid sets of five pairs that have letters that sum to 26 and use each digit only 
once, we find that there are 2148 groupings.
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Now that we have the stepping counts from Phase 1, we can calculate the stepping ratios 
for each cipher rotor. The stepping ratio is just the step count divided by the number of 
letters. Once we have the ratios computed, we can attempt to distinguish the number of 
letters connected to each cipher rotor in the index permutation. 
Consider an example where the cipher rotors had the following stepping ratios.
Cipher Rotor Stepping Ratio
C0 0.15
C1 0.29
C2 0.60
C3 0.74
C4 0.91
Table 9: Example Stepping Ratios [1]
Using the results from Table 8, the most likely number of letters connected to cipher rotors 
C0, C1, C2, C3, C4 are 1, 2, 5, 7, and 11 respectively. Of the 2148 valid combination of pairs 
from Table 7, there are six sets of pairs that are consistent with the number of letters 
derived from Table 8. These six sets of pairs are shown in Table 10.
Set Pairs
1 (0,1) (2,9) (3,4) (5,6) (7,8)
2 (0,1) (2,9) (3,5) (4,6) (7,8)
3 (0,2) (1,9) (3,4) (5,6) (7,8)
4 (0,2) (1,9) (3,5) (4,6) (7,8)
5 (0,9) (1,2) (3,4) (5,6) (7,8)
6 (0,9) (1,2) (3,5) (4,6) (7,8)
Table 10: Sets Of Pairs Consistent with Letter Counts 1, 2, 5, 7, and 11 [1]
According to [1], the 2148 consistent groupings of five pairs can be reduced to 89 distinct 
categories based on letter counts. Using the previous example, one of the 89 categories 
would be one that corresponded to letter counts of 1, 2, 5, 7, and 11 letters. On average, 
there are 24 sets of five pairs for each category, with the actual range being between 3 and 
72. 
With the stepping counts computed, we can now compute a score to determine which of the 
89 categories is the best match. Let xi be the step ratio in row i for Table 8. Then 1 ≤ i ≤11 
and xi is the expected fraction of the time that a cipher rotor steps when it is connected to i 
letters. For convenience, let x0 = 0 and x12 = 1.
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For the known plaintext, we compute the five stepping ratios s0, s1, s2, s3, and s4 where we 
assume s0 < s1 < s2 < s3 < s4. For each sj stepping ratio, we determine the index i for which xi 
≤ sj < xi + 1. Then we let 
ii
ij
j xx
xs
t
−
−
=
+ 1
 with the provisions that if tj < 1, we set tj = 1 and if ti 
> 11, we set ti = 11. Here we note that i ≤ tj ≤ i + 1 and t0 < t1 < t2 < t3 < t4. Each tj is a 
decimal representation (including the fractional part) of the most likely number of letters 
connected with cipher rotor j. We are using a linear interpolation for the points between 
consecutive xi values since the xi values are not equally spaced.
Next, we let (u0, u1, u2, u3, u4) be one of the 89 categories that was discussed earlier where 
u0 < u1 < u2 < u3 < u4. We compute the score as the square of the Euclidean distance. For 
each category, we compute d = (to – u0)2 + (t1 – u1)2 + (t2 – u2)2 + (t3 – u3)2 + (t4 – u4)2. The 
category that has the smallest distance d from (t0, t1, t2, t3, t4) is selected as the most likely 
category.
Table 11 shows some empirical results about how many letters of known plaintext we 
would need for the secondary phase of the attack using the scoring method discussed. In the 
table, we can see that for 100 known plaintext letters, we have a 0.2332 probability of 
having all five pairs correct. If we consider the case where two of the pairs are off by +1 
letter and –1 letter, we get the percentage in the last column of the table. For 100 letters, we 
would have a 0.8216 probability that the pairs are either all correct, or off by +1/-1. Since 
there are 24 sets of pairs on average for a category, we would need to test less than 28 sets 
of pairs on average (24 * 


 5
2
 = 24 * 10 = 240 < 28) to get the correct index permutation 
with a 0.8216 probability of success. 
We have more information available to us from Table 11. If at any point, only one of the 
five cipher rotors step, then we can eliminate rows 1, 2, and 3 from Table 7 since the 
control rotor permutation always have four active outputs. From Table 12, we see that a 
single rotor stepping is a relatively rare occurrence. It only occurs about 2.5% of the time. 
When it does occur, it can eliminate up to ¼ of the possible index permutations. Using such 
refinements, we expect to be able to reduce the plaintext requirements from Table 11 
without decreasing out probability of success. However, since we merged paths in the 
primary phase, it may be difficult to utilize this information.
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Pairs Correct
Plaintext
Letters
0 1 2 3 4 5 Iterations Probability
(+/- 1 Letter)
50 0.0287 0.2213 0.1837 0.4756 0.0000 0.091 1000000 0.5666
100 0.0036 0.1076 0.0672 0.5884 0.0000 0.2332 1000000 0.8216
150 0.0006 0.0517 0.0234 0.5522 0.0000 0.3721 1000000 0.9243
200 0.0001 0.0253 0.0085 0.4722 0.0000 0.4939 1000000 0.9661
250 0.0000 0.0128 0.0033 0.3900 0.0000 0.5939 1000000 0.9839
300 0.0000 0.0064 0.0013 0.3153 0.0000 0.6769 1000000 0.9922
400 0.0000 0.0018 0.0002 0.2023 0.0000 0.7957 1000000 0.9980
500 0.0000 0.0005 0.0001 0.1300 0.0000 0.8694 1000000 0.9994
1000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0157 0.0000 0.9843 1000000 1.0000
Table 11: Secondary Known Plaintext [1]
To summarize, by using the cipher rotor stepping counts, we can reduce the index 
permutations to a fraction of the 
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≈ 216.8 that would need to be considered. With enough 
known plaintext, we can reduce to around 28 permutations, and possibly even less. 
Assuming we had a message with 100 known plaintext letters, the average work factor for 
Phase 2 would be around 28 * 5! * 25 * 265 ≈ 243.3. It should be possible to further reduce the 
factor of 28. This is a significant improvement over the naïve implementation of Phase 2’s 
work factor of 252.2. These refinements to Phase 2 also make the work factor comparable to 
the work of Phase 1. However, the work factor applies to each survivor of Phase 1. To 
improve the overall performance of the attack, we need to reduce either the number of 
survivors from Phase 1 and/or make Phase 2 more efficient.
The following is a method to use the information from the cipher rotor stepping counts 
obtained in Phase 1. For each distinct index permutation, we can compute the probabilities 
pi for i = 1, 2, 3, and 4 that exactly i cipher rotors step, where the probabilities are computed 
over all possible control rotor outputs. Recall that we are modeling each of the four letter 
control rotor outputs as being equally likely. The average, maximum and minimum over all 
the index permutations appear in Table 12.
 
Rotors 
That Step
Average Maximum Minimum
1 0.0109 0.0247 0.0027
2 0.2543 0.3579 0.1694
3 0.5669 0.5954 0.5177
4 0.1679 0.2368 0.0996
Table 12: Cipher Rotor Steppings
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An interesting thing to notice about the results from Table 12 is that the range of the values 
is small and only overlap when 2 and 4 rotors step. The ranges for 1 and 3 rotors stepping 
do not overlap. Consequently, this means that we assign a score to each survivor of Phase 1 
without making any assumptions about the index permutation. For each survivor, we 
compute a score based on the number of cipher rotors that stepped for each known plaintext 
letter. Then, in the secondary phase, we can test the highest scoring survivor, then the 
second highest, and so on. This method would trim away unlikely paths in Phase 1, 
reducing the number of survivors that are sent to Phase 2. The merging of paths in Phase 1 
creates a slight complication since different number of rotors can be stepped to reach the 
merge position. A solution to this would be to take the maximum probability of the paths 
that merge. 
Assuming we have sufficient known plaintext, we have shown that the work factor for the 
secondary phase for each survivor of Phase 1 is around 243. This amount of work is feasible 
for today’s technology, although the actual attack is not trivial to implement. The primary 
phase has a similar work factor and is feasible for today’s technology. However, in the 
attack described here, the number of survivors from Phase 1 is large, which makes cost of 
the attack quite high.
5. Attack Comparisons
It would be beneficial to compare the work factors related to attacking SIGABA. To remain 
consistent, we will split each attack into a primary and secondary phase. We first discussed 
a straightforward exhaustive key search. The primary phase for an exhaustive key search 
has 243.4 different cipher rotor settings to test. For a straightforward secondary phase, as 
described in Section 3.4, there were 252.5 different control and index rotor settings to test for 
each of settings from the primary phase. This gives a maximum work factor of 295.6 and an 
expected work factor of 294.6 to find the correct setting. This attack has a success rate of one 
since all settings are tested.
Now let us consider an attack that uses one known plaintext letter. The primary phase for 
this attack would again consist of trying all the cipher rotor settings, yielding a work factor 
of 243.4. However, since we have one known plaintext letter, we expect only 1/26 of the 
settings to survive. This gives us an estimate of 
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2 4.43 ≈ 238.7 survivors for the primary phase. 
The secondary phase requires trying all control and index rotor settings, which like the 
exhaustive key search described in the last paragraph, has a work factor of 252.2. This gives 
a total work factor of 290.9. Again, we expect to find the correct setting after a work factor of 
289.9 with a probability of success of one. 
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Next, we consider an attack that uses 100 plaintext letters. According to the primary phase 
described in Section 3.3, we expect 4.435 2*100*10
5.100*203
≈
 234.5 survivors from Phase 1. Using 
a straightforward Phase 2, as described in Section 3.4, which has a work factor of 252.2, this 
attack would have a maximum work factor of 286.7 and an expected work factor of 285.7 
before we find the correct setting. Again, the probability of success in this attack is one.
Finally, we consider an attack using the primary phase described in Section 3.3 and the 
refined secondary phase from Section 4 with 100 known plaintext letters. In the secondary 
phase, we must test the surviving merged paths instead of the settings. From Section 3.3, 
we see that the number of merged paths grows to about 241.1 paths. From Section 4, we 
know that the work for the secondary phase with 100 known plaintext letters is about 243.4. 
This gives a total work factor of around 284.5, with an expected work factor of 283.5. The 
probability for success in this attack is only 0.82 (see Table 11).
While the last attack described in this section is a modest improvement over a 
straightforward secondary phase and is now only probabilistic with regards to success, 
there are refinements that can be made to reduce the work factor. Trimming of paths with a 
low probability in Phase 1 is one such refinement.
The different attacks mentioned above are summarized in Table 13. This table shows that 
while our attack on SIGABA is far from being practical, it is more efficient than the 
obvious attacks on the full keyspace of SIGABA. However, for our attack to succeed, we 
must have a favorable amount of known plaintext. Our attack is also probabilistic, though 
with enough known plaintext, we have a fairly high probability of success. This can been 
seen as additional evidence as to why SIGABA was never broken during World War II. 
Attack Primary
Survivors
Secondary
Work
Total
Work
Probability
Of Success
Exhaustive Key Search 243.4 252.2 295.6 1.00
1 Known Plaintext 238.7 252.2 290.6 1.00
100 Known Plaintexts 234.5 252.2 286.7 1.00
100 Known Plaintexts 241.1 243.4 284.5 0.82
Table 13: Attack Comparisons [1]
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6. Simulator
For this paper, a simulation of the SIGABA cipher machine was needed in order to 
implement and test the different parts of the attack. A simulator has been coded that we 
believe closely matches the behavior of the online simulator written by Richard Pekelney at 
[8], which appears to be the standard SIGABA simulator. There is Windows-based 
simulator with a better graphical user interface at [7]. The Windows-based SIGABA 
simulator is also based on the simulator written by Richard Pekelney. Our simulator does 
not contain as many features as the simulator online but the encryption and decryption 
algorithm matches the behavior of the online simulator in CSP-889 mode. 
All the attacks described in Section 3 & 4 were tested using the simulator we have written 
since we needed to have a simulator where we have control over the different sections of 
code that represent the encryption and decryption algorithm. Another reason why we 
needed our own simulator is that the attack’s execution efficiency is an important factor. 
The execution efficiency of a Java program is low, so we had to write our simulator in C, 
which has higher execution efficiency. For our simulator, we duplicated the rotor wiring 
from the Java simulator. However, it should be noted that of those wirings, only the index 
rotor wirings are actual rotor wirings. Richard Pekelney made up the wiring for the control 
and cipher rotors since the rotors he had access to were straight-pass-through rotors only. 
In our simulator, the rotors are an array of offsets from their respective letters. Suppose we 
had a cipher rotor that had the following offsets.
24 1 5 8 12 13 14 25 19 20 24 12 1 12 22 15 1 24 3 16 25 5 0 8 16 13
This means that ‘A’ is offset by 24 letters, ‘B’ is offset by 1 letter, ‘C’ by 5 letters, and so 
forth, where ‘A’ is considered position 0, ‘B’ position 1, and so forth. This means that this 
particular rotor has the following permutation.
YCHLQSUGBDIXNZKERPVJTAWFOM
The offsets for the index rotors are used in the same manner. Suppose we had an index 
rotor with the following offsets: 7 4 7 8 0 3 6 9 5 1. This means that 0 maps to 7, 1 maps to 
5, 2 maps to 9, and so forth. The actual rotor permutation would be 7591482630. A list of 
all the rotor permutations used is included in Appendix A.
The source code for the simulator and the source code for the attack are included on the 
enclosed CD-ROM disc. 
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7. Conclusion
As generally used during World War II, SIGABA had a keyspace of size 248.4, which means 
the expected work for an exhaustive key search was 247.4. However, the POTUS-PRIME 
link between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill used the full keyspace of 
over 95 bits. For a designer of a cryptographic system, there is no reason to have a 
keyspace larger than a known shortcut attack on the system since a larger keyspace entails 
more settings and more chance for errors. During the war, the work factor for an exhaustive 
key search would have been impossible to do. Since SIGABA was used for strategically 
important tactical information, like the POTUS-PRIME link between President Roosevelt 
and Prime Minister Churchill, a larger keyspace may have been desired if it provided a 
greater amount of security. In this paper, we describe an attack on the full keyspace of 
SIGABA that requires less than 95 bits of work. The attack described here can certainly be 
improved so that it runs more efficiently. By making the attack more efficient, the number 
of survivors from Phase 1 and the number of cases that need to be tested in Phase 2 for each 
survivor of Phase 1 is reduced. This reduction will lead to a more practical attack.
SIGABA’s large keyspace certainly played a role in ensuring that enemy forces never 
broke it. The designers of SIGABA were obviously aware of how important the seemingly 
random stepping of the machine was to the security of the cipher after having studied and 
broken other rotor-based cipher machines. Although they may not have looked at the 
strength of the cipher in terms of bits, they surely knew that their design would make an 
attack infeasible during World War II. Commanders of the Army and Navy were also 
aware of how important it was to physically guard the machines from capture and the 
detrimental effects of operational error. These two factors combined made SIGABA very 
hard to attack since it appeared to step randomly and physical security on the machine was 
very high. While the physical security of the machine was important since it made an attack 
harder, it is not something that should be depended on. Assuming an attacker could get hold 
of the machine and the rotor wirings, the cipher would still be secure. Even after more than 
fifty years, the analysis of attacks on SIGABA seem to indicate that having the machine 
and the rotor wirings would not be that helpful in breaking the cipher. This would indicate 
that during the war, if enemy forces had obtained the machine and rotors, they would still 
not be able to compromise the cipher. 
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Appendix A: Rotor Permutations
Cipher Rotor 0 YCHLQSUGBDIXNZKERPVJTAWFOM
Cipher Rotor 1 INPXBWETGUYSAOCHVLDMQKZJFR
Cipher Rotor 2 WNDRIOZPTAXHFJYQBMSVEKUCGL
Cipher Rotor 3 TZGHOBKRVUXLQDMPNFWCJYEIAS
Cipher Rotor 4 YWTAHRQJVLCEXUNGBIPZMSDFOK
Control Rotor 0 QSLRBTEKOGAICFWYVMHJNXZUDP
Control Rotor 1 CHJDQIGNBSAKVTUOXFWLEPRMZY
Control Rotor 2 CDFAJXTIMNBEQHSUGRYLWZKVPO
Control Rotor 3 XHFESZDNRBCGKQIJLTVMUOYAPW
Control Rotor 4 EZJQXMOGYTCSFRIUPVNADLHWBK
Index Rotor 1 7591482630
Index Rotor 2 3810592764
Index Rotor 3 4086153297
Index Rotor 4 3980526174
Index Rotor 5 6497135280
35
Appendix B: Simulator Commands
Set of commands for the simulation include:
!quit 
!q 
Quit program
!reset 
!r 
Reload configuration and reset rotors
!encrypt 
!e 
Switch to encryption mode [default mode]
!decrypt 
!d 
Switch to decryption mode
!reverse 
!rev 
Reverse a rotor
!encryptfromfile !
eff 
Encrypt using the plaintext from a file
!printConf 
!pc 
Print the rotor permutations
!printPos 
!pp 
Print the rotor positions
!printoffsets 
!po 
Print the rotor offsets
!set 
!s 
Set a rotor
!setpositions 
!sp 
Set the positions of the rotors. String of 15 characters. 0-9 must be 
letters from A-Z and 10-15 must be digits 0-9
!setrotors 
!sr 
Set the rotors to use and their order. String of 15 characters. 0-9 must 
be a permutation of 0-9 and 10-14 must be a permutation of 1-5
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Appendix C: Glossary
Cipher Rotor Rotor that permutes letters to letters. Interchangeable with the control rotors. 
Reversible.
Control 
Rotor
Rotor that permutes letters to letters. Interchangeable with the cipher rotors. 
Reversible.
CSP Code and Signal Publication
ECM Electronic Cipher Machine
Index Rotor Rotor that permutes digits to digits
Key Collection of settings used to initialize the machine. This includes:
- The five rotors to be used as cipher rotors, their ordering, their initial 
positions, and their orientations.
- The five rotors to be used as control rotors, their ordering, their 
initial positions, and their orientations.
- The ordering of the five index rotors and their initial positions.
Path An initial setting for the cipher rotors along with the stepping pattern of the 
cipher rotors that lead to the correct ciphertext
POTUS-
PRIME
President of The United States – Prime Minister
Rotor A mechanical wheel that permutes a set on inputs to a set of outputs.
Rotor Bank A set of five rotors that are used for the same function. 
Rotor Cage Holds the three rotor banks: cipher rotor bank, control rotor bank, and index 
rotor bank.
Setting Initial positions, and orientations of rotors
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